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VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND CERTIFICATION – 
EXPERIENCES FROM AMERICA 
Incorporation of “Private” Environmental Certification Systems in 
Formal Legal Systems: the U.S. Case* 
Errol E. Meidinger∗∗ 
1 Introduction 
More and more industrial organizations are will-
ingly committing to meet heightened environmental 
standards through private environmental certifica-
tion programs. Such programs generally claim to 
harness the incentives of the market to promote the 
public interest.1 The programs typically define the 
environmental standards that firms must meet and 
establish organizational mechanisms for achieving 
and “certifying” compliance. Well known examples 
include the chemical industry’s “Responsible Care” 
program,2 the International Organization for Stan-
dardization’s ISO 14000 environmental manage-
ment program,3 and the Forest Stewardship Coun-
cil’s well-managed forests program.4 
*© Errol E. Meidinger, 2000. This is a revision of a paper presented to the 
CAVA workshop on “The Integration of Voluntary Approaches into Existing 
Legal Systems,” held in Brussels, February 24-25, 2000. Helpful com-
ments by workshop participants, and by Guyora Binder, Chris Elliott, and 
students in my University of Freiburg Forest Certification seminar are 
gratefully acknowledged, as is the research assistance of Patrick Omilian. 
Also much appreciated was the supportive work environment of the Insti-
tute for Forest Economics at the University of Freiburg, where the paper 
was completed. 
** Professor and Vice Dean of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, 
NY 14260-1100, . 
Fulbright Senior Scholar, Institute for Forest Economics, University of 
Freiburg, 1999-2000. Email: eemeid@buffalo.edu; 
Web: http://www.ublaw.buffalo.edu/fas/meidinger. 
1 E.g., Errol Meidinger, Look Who’s Making the Rules: the Roles of the FSC 
and ISO in International Environmental Policy. 4 HUM. ECOL. REV. 52 
(1997). 
2 The American Responsible Care Program is described at 
http://www.cmahq.com. The Canadian program (the first in the world) is at 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00797e.html. For a general overview see, 
Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical In-
dustry: Assessing Responsible Care, 17 L. & POL. 57-109 (1995) 
3 See ISO Website: http://www.iso.ch/9000e/isoanden.htm. For a general 
overview, see e.g., Steven Bass, Introducing Forest Certification, Report 
of the International Institute for Environment and Development (1997) 
http://www.efi.fi/publications/Discussion_Papers/01.pdf or Errol Meidinger, 
‘Private’ Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and Community, 6 
BUFF. ENV. L. J. 132 (1999) (hereafter Meidinger, Private Environmental 
Regulation) http://www.ublaw.buffalo.edu/fas/meidinger/hrec.pdf 
4 See FSC Website: http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm. For general 
overviews, see again Bass or Meidinger, supra note 3. There are numer-
ous other private environmental certification programs. Many of the older 
ones concentrate on food labeling, particularly in Europe. Many of the 
newer ones focus on particular sectors of environmental management, 
such as forestry, fishing, chemical production, and so on. 
With their standard setting, adjudication, and im-
plementation mechanisms, certification programs 
bear an interesting resemblance to government 
regulatory programs. Yet, because of their appar-
ently autonomous and voluntary nature, these “uni-
lateral commitment” programs5 are often conceptu-
alized as separate and distinct from legal systems. It 
appears, however, that certification systems are 
deeply intertwined with law. Not only do they use 
legal mechanisms to organize themselves and con-
trol their members, they also cite the possibility of 
intensified legal regulation to attract members. 
Perhaps more importantly, they can have a signifi-
cant influence on governmental policies, and on the 
content and implementation of legal rules. Given 
the common focus of certification and legal systems 
on policy-making and control, it seems obvious that 
they will intersect and interact in various ways. 
The goal of this paper is to describe the main ways 
in which environmental certification systems are 
likely to interact with the U.S. legal system. Al-
though certification systems depend on legal sys-
tems to organize themselves, and may also increase 
the institutionalization of law in private organiza-
tions in important ways, this paper focuses primar-
ily on how legal systems use, are influenced by, and 
respond to certification systems.6 Its working hy-
pothesis is that environmental certification systems 
will have a substantial influence on the substance 
and operation of the U.S. legal system over time. Its 
primary goal is to describe the avenues through 
5 This categorization reflects the work of the Concerted Action on Voluntary 
Approaches (CAVA) project, an EU-supported effort to develop a research 
network and a body of research on the use of “voluntary approaches” to 
improved environmental management. 
http://www.ensmp.fr/Fr/CERNA/CERNA/Progeuropeens/CAVA/index.html 
See, Steven Baeke, Marc DeClercq, and Erik Matthijs, The Nature of 
Voluntary Approaches: Empirical Evidence and Patterns: Literature Sur-
vey, CAVA Working Paper no 99/08/3, August 1999; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, VOLUNTARY APPROACHES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT (1999). Certifica-
tion systems are a special kind of unilateral commitment program, since 
they do not claim to be “one shot” efforts, but rather set up frameworks for 
long-term policy development and implementation. 
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which certification systems are likely to shape the 
legal system. Because of the potentially high degree 
of legal influence by certification, legal systems are 
also likely to try to constrain or shape certification 
systems. So the paper also describes the primary 
means through which this may happen. 
It is too early in the development of private envi-
ronmental certification systems to offer either an 
assessment of their overall societal importance or a 
strong theory explaining their emergence and ex-
pansion.7 Their normative implications must also be 
left to other papers.8 Before reviewing the ways in 
which certification systems can be incorporated into 
law, however, it is helpful to give some definition to 
the key terms: “legal system” and “certification 
system.” 
a  Legal Systems 
Of course, the definitions of “law” and “legal sys-
tem” have been much disputed over the years, and 
will not be resolved here. For present purposes it is 
sufficient to note that there is widespread accep-
tance that legal systems have the following fea-
tures:9 
(1) Legislative bodies, often representing defined 
interests, make rules governing actors within 
their jurisdiction. 
(2) Adjudicative bodies determine the applicability 
of rules in particular cases. In doing so they of-
ten give further definition to rules. 
(3) Enforcement bodies 
(a) gather information on compliance with 
rules, and 
(b) use sanctions (punishments and rewards), to 
promote compliance. 
(4) The legal bodies operate under rules, ordinar-
ily governing both their composition and pro-
cedures. The latter often include public partici-
pation requirements. 
(5) Actions taken by legal bodies are not fully de-
termined by rules. They also involve the exer-
cise of judgment and discretion.10 
7 For a preliminary effort, see Meidinger, supra note 3. 
8 See id. 
9 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1980). 
Although I am using western legal terms here, such as legislation and 
adjudication, these terms need not be used by legal systems. The key 
idea is that they have ways of formulating rules, determining their applica-
bility, applying sanctions, and so on. 
10 The amount of discretion, however, may often look larger when viewed 
from the perspective of rules than when viewed within a social context 
including cultural assumptions, shared operating procedures, and the like. 
E.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline. 9 L. & 
POL., 355-386 (1987); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents 
1997, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1299 (1997). 
(6) Sovereign states provide the primary authority 
and implementation mechanisms. 
The last criterion is asserted by many,11 but not all12 
legal theorists. It has long faced problems regarding 
how democratic a state must be for its rules to 
qualify as law. More recently, the growth of a 
global order transcending individual states yet en-
acting rules that operate like laws has created prob-
lems for this conception.13 These issues receive 
further attention in the conclusion of this paper. 
b) Certification Systems 
Although there is no uniform definition of a certifi-
cation system, and existing programs that are classi-
fied as certification systems vary greatly, most 
definitions include the following elements: 
(1) Standard setting bodies operating with defined 
membership and decision processes. These can 
be either industry groups, as in the Responsible 
Care Program, or broader sets of stakeholders, 
as in the Forest Stewardship Council.14 
(2) Standards for certification, 
(a) These tend to follow either or both of two 
general approaches: 
(i) Substantive performance standards (the 
FSC approach);15 
(ii) Environmental management system 
standards (the ISO approach)16, stressing 
1. enterprise-based policy making; 
2. detailed organizational arrangements 
for planning, information gathering, 
monitoring, compliance assessment, 
and plan revision; and 
3. continuous improvement in either 
a. the management system, or 
b. environmental performance.17 
E.g., Hans Kelsen, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 
(1945). Kelsen, like most western legal theorists of the late 19th and 20th 
centuries, argued that law must involve a threat of punishment by the 
state. 
12 E.g., Friedrich Charles von Savigny, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE 
FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Arno Press 1975) (Abra-
ham Hayward trans., London 1831). Savigny argued that law "is first de-
veloped by custom...next by jurisprudence -- everywhere, therefore, by 
internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver." 
Id at 30. He was arguing against the creation of a national law for Ger-
many, and in favor of preserving local variation. 
13 E.g., Guenther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal 
and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. LAW. 149 (1997). 
14 The scope of certification programs varies. They can be global, regional, 
national, or even sub-national, though subnational and national programs 
are likely to be viable only in the narrowest markets. 
15 See Appendix A for the primary FSC management principles, and exam-
ples of criteria applying them. 
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(b) Certification can attach to an enterprise, a 
product, or both. 
(3) Organizational mechanisms for certifying com-
pliance of individual firms with applicable stan-
dards, which generally: 
(a) rely heavily on professional expertise, 
(b) focus on information production and man-
agement, 
(c) struggle over the relative independence of 
the certification body from the firm.18 
(4) Provisions for public participation19 
(5) Mechanisms for sanctioning non-compliance, 
usually: 
(a) withdrawal of certification, and/or 
(b) expulsion from an industry group.20 
Thus, many environmental certification systems 
have most of the basic organizational elements of 
legal systems. The Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC), for example, has a constitutional structure 
establishing an international “general assembly” 
representing economic, environmental, and social 
interests in equal proportions, and giving northern 
(developed) and southern (developing) societies 
equal voting power within each interest.21 It also 
provides for national and regional legislative bodies 
to define place-based forest management standards 
and criteria, which become applicable upon ap-
proval by the General Assembly. The central and 
regional legislative bodies have promulgated a large 
number of rules governing forest management, its 
evaluation, and certification, which closely resem-
ble what legal scholars ordinarily call legislation.22 
17 Whether improvements in the system are acceptable, or whether im-
provements in outcome measures should be required is a major source of 
in the debate about certification systems. See e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 
Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, the International Organization for 
Standardization, and International Environmental Lawmaking, in Günther 
Handl, 6 YEARRBOOK OF INTL ENVTL LAW 107 (1995); Joel Ticknor, 
ISO 14,000: Will it Deter Cleaner Production, 8 NEW SOLUTIONS 285, 
286 (1998); Pierre Hauselmann, ISO Inside Out: ISO and Environmental 
Management, WWF International Discussion Paper (1997). 
18 Many voluntary codes and certification programs started with self-
certification by the firm, then moved to trade association certification, and 
now seem to be moving to third party certification. There is a growing 
understanding in the field that unless programs are monitored by credible 
third parties (sometimes environmental NGOs, sometimes organizations 
vetted by them), they are unlikely to be seen as credible. 
19 Public participation provisions vary considerably among programs, and 
often seem designed to limit rather than expand the public role in standard 
setting and certification. See Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation, 
supra note3. 
20 There is no systematic information on how often certification systems 
actually employ sanctions. My impression from communicating with 
knowledgeable sources is that sanctions have rarely been imposed to 
date. 
21 For a thorough description of the FSC structure, see Meidinger, Private 
Environmental Regulation, supra note 3. 
22 For examples, see Appendix A. Note that much but not all of the legisla-
tion is applicable to forestry management. Much of it also defines how the 
Much like a government agency, the FSC also has 
standards and procedures for accrediting the certifi-
ers who determine whether forest management units 
meet FSC management standards. The certifiers act 
as both adjudicators and enforcers of standards. 
First they are charged with determining whether 
applicants for certification meet the various eco-
logical, operational, economic, and social criteria. 
Second, they are charged with monitoring firms that 
receive certification and can revoke certificates if 
forest management falls below set standards. As in 
many regulatory regimes, considerable responsibil-
ity for collecting information and reporting on com-
pliance falls to regulated firms. 
FSC certifiers exercise a great deal of discretion and 
judgment in determining whether individual forest 
management operations meet the standards for 
certification. This is due to both the inherent com-
plexity of forest management and the multiple envi-
ronmental, social, and economic goals of the certifi-
cation regime. Although substantive and organiza-
tional details vary, other environmental certification 
systems, including those of the International Or-
ganization for Standardization and the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association, established primarily by 
industry,23 show similar organizational patterns.24 
The institutional characteristic typical of a legal 
system that the FSC and most other private envi-
ronmental certification systems lack is a command 
from a sovereign directing all management organi-
zations in a given category to achieve certification 
standards, and subjecting them to sovereign-
imposed penalties for failure to do so. As indicated 
above, certification systems are generally charac-
terized as “voluntary.” Firms subscribe to them 
because they determine that it is in their interest to 
do so. Yet it is increasingly common to describe 
environmental certification as a “de facto require-
various bodies in the FSC system are to operate, as would be the case 
with traditional legislation. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administra-
tive State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989). 
23 I do not use the term “self regulation” here, for two reasons. The most 
obvious is that some systems, such as those of the Forest Stewardship 
Council and the Marine Stewardship Council, have been established pri-
marily by environmental NGOs, and not by industry. Secondly, the term 
“self” can obscure the organizational dynamics of regulation, since there 
are complex and distinct interests within many industry based regulatory 
programs. Nonetheless, the work of scholars who have studied self-
regulation is fundamental to this research. E.g., Ian Ayres and John 
Braithwaite, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Peter N. Grabosky, Green Markets: 
Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector, 16 L. & POL. 419-48 
(1994). 
24 See generally Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation, supra note 3; 
Gunningham supra note 2. The primary institutional differences at this 
time have to do with how broad partcipation is in the standard setting 
process and the degree of independence and professionalism necessary 
to make verification of compliance credible. 
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ment” for doing business in many jurisdictions.25 
When interviewed, corporate officials often state 
that they feel they have “no real choice” but to 
become environmentally certified. The reasons they 
give vary, and include such factors as avoiding 
intensified government regulation, maintaining or 
expanding market share, averting negative public-
ity, improving community and/or employee rela-
tions, improving organizational efficiency, meeting 
demands of up-stream sellers or down-stream buy-
ers,26 obtaining higher prices, avoiding legal liabil-
ity, increasing shareholder confidence, and so on. 
Although many of these reasons do not flow di-
rectly from state regulation, they do suggest a con-
text in which industrial enterprises view environ-
mental certification as a mandatory condition of 
operating in modern society. 
Thus, the gap between coercive state regulation and 
“voluntary” private certification is not as wide as 
one might expect. Moreover, many of the reasons 
given to explain the growth of certification have at 
different times in history been grounds for ex-
panded government regulation. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that complex relationships might emerge 
between certification and legal systems. 
The next two sections catalog some of the legal 
channels through which those relationships can 
operate. Section 2 lists legal mechanisms that seem 
largely receptive to certification systems, while 
Section 3 lists ones that seem resistant. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that most of the legal mecha-
nisms described below could in principle be used 
either to promote or to undermine certification 
programs. State environmental regulatory agencies, 
for example, could prohibit certification of firms or 
otherwise punish certified firms. The primary rea-
son that they do not appear likely to do so is that 
certification programs claim to build upon state 
regulatory programs. Participating firms claim to be 
going “beyond compliance,” and it would be very 
difficult for agencies to rationalize prohibiting firms 
from doing so, or punishing them for it. Nonethe-
less, it is possible to interpret rules as “ceilings” and 
not just as “floors,” and regulatory folklore has it 
that officials and industry groups sometimes punish 
firms informally for going above ceilings. 
25 E.g., Virginia Haufler, “Private Sector International Regimes, 4 POLIBUS 2 
(1998); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17 at 119; Ticknor, supra note 17 at 286. 
26 Ford Motor Company, for example, recently announced that it will require 
all of its suppliers to have at least one manufacturing site ISO 14001 cer-
tiified by the of 2001. General Motors Corporation is requiring to meet the 
ISO 14001 standard, but not necessarily to be registered, by the end of 
2002. Amy Zuckerman, Ford, GM set ISO 14000 Requirements, NEW 
STEEL, Mar. 1, 2000 at 58. 
2 Legal Incorporation of Certification Sys-
tems 
Private environmental certification systems can be 
incorporated in formal legal systems in many possi-
ble ways. The list that follows is preliminary, and is 
intended to characterize the problem with sufficient 
precision to allow further inquiry. As will be dis-
cussed in Section 4, the list is largely limited to 
“legal” mechanisms as they are conceived in tradi-
tional legal scholarship. Other important micro and 
macro dimensions of incorporation should also be 
considered. 
a) Legal requirement of certification 
The most obvious means of incorporating certifica-
tion into a legal system would be for an authorita-
tive legal body to require that firms operating 
within its jurisdiction be certified. That legal body 
could be either a legislature, or an administrative 
agency with a broad mandate to achieve environ-
mental improvement. There is much to commend 
this strategy, since it can mandate global, state-of-
the-art standards, place much of the administrative 
burden on non-state bureaucracies funded by the 
enterprises involved, and garner some of the politi-
cal legitimacy of environmental NGOs for the state 
regulatory system. Its downsides include a reduc-
tion in state control over regulatory policy (although 
the state retains the option of imposing and admin-
istering its own standards) and potentially higher 
costs of operation for enterprises than if state agen-
cies bore the costs of administration.27 To date there 
are only a few examples of states requiring envi-
ronmental certification: the Brazilian state of Acre 
recently made FSC certification a requirement of 
practicing forestry in the state28 and Zimbabwe has 
incorporated ISO 14001 into its regulatory system.29 
Yet it seems likely that their numbers will grow as 
the certification systems mature and become better 
known. 
Administrative agencies also have the capacity to 
require certification. They would most likely use 
27 Of course there are contending normative arguments regarding who 
should bear administrative costs. One position is that the public should 
bear them, since the certification program promotes the public interest in 
an improved environment. The other is that the enterprise should bear 
them, ordinarily through increased costs to its consumers, since it creates 
the situation requiring the regulatory program. This is the so-called “pol-
luter pays” principle. The position one takes on these questions depends 
on the entitlement structure from which one begins the analysis. 
28 Personal communications, Professor Dr. Michel Becker, Institute for 
Forest Policy, University of Freiburg and Dr. Dietrich Burger, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Organization for 
Technical Cooperation), Frankfurt. 
29 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Standards 
Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation? 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 
237, 276 (2000). Whether these examples are evidence that developing 
countries are especially likely to adopt private environmental certification 
requirements in their regulatory systems can only be known over time. 
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rules, in conjunction with contracts, as mechanisms 
for doing so. A rule, for example, could simply 
require firms operating in the jurisdiction to be 
certified by a specific program, or by one of several 
eligible programs. Contracts could then be used by 
the agency to achieve a degree of control over the 
certification programs without going through more 
cumbersome rulemaking or adjudication proce-
dures. While these methods are being used in some 
other areas of privatization, such as prisons and 
healthcare,30 their extension to environmental 
regulation would probably be a new development. It 
should be noted, however, that the U.S. environ-
mental laws already give a large role to private 
enforcers through “citizen suit” provisions, which 
allow interested parties to bring enforcement ac-
tions for violations of federal or state pollution 
control standards.31 
In the U.S. legal system a law requiring private 
certification would probably face legal challenges 
based on the “non-delegation doctrine,” which is 
generally held to prohibit the delegation of law 
making powers to private actors.32 There is a simple 
solution, however, which is for the legislature to 
review the standards involved and to enact them as 
its own if it so chooses. It may even suffice for the 
legislature to reserve the power to review the pri-
vate rules and to provide for judicial review of them 
under general administrative law.33 In the case of 
administrative agencies, which have convened a 
number of negotiated rulemaking (“reg-neg”) com-
mittees of stakeholders to negotiate draft rules in 
recent years, it is sufficient that the agency convene 
a “balanced” committee, review the rule developed 
by the committee, and subject it to normal agency 
decisional procedures.34 
30 See generally, Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 543 (2000); Laurent Hourcle and Frederick J. Lees, Appli-
cability of ISO 14000 Standards to Government Contracts, 27 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10071 (1997). 
31 See generally, Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Analysis of Citizen Suits Under Federal Envi-
ronmental Laws, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 834-965 (1985). Government agen-
cies can exercise control over such actions either by taking over prosecu-
tion of the case or by intervening in the private enforcement action. If the 
government does take over prosecution of the case, the private litigant 
retains the right to continue participating as an intervenor. Id. 
32 The key decision was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) 
which invalidated a New Deal statute allowing bituminous coal producers 
to elect boards to set minimum prices for coal in their districts. The court 
stressed the possible conflicts of interests of business representatives 
regulating others in their industry. For a sophisticated contemporary 
analysis, see Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Con-
gressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal 
Government, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 62 (1990) 
33 This is what the states often have done when privatizing prison admini-
stration. Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison 
Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911 (1988). 
34 As authorized by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 101 P.L. 648; 
104 Stat. 4969. The statute requires the agency to exercise somewhat 
If state or federal governmental bodies in the U.S. 
were to mandate certification, questions regarding 
the applicability of anti-trust law and administrative 
law would also arise. While they are too involved to 
discuss fully here, they could likely be managed. 
U.S. anti-trust law has a general exception for anti-
competitive conditions resulting from intentional 
state action.35 Thus anti-trust questions could be 
handled by clear, legislatively authorized policies 
combined with state supervision of the certification 
36program. 
The administrative law issues would divide among 
statutory and constitutional questions. The main 
constitutional question would be whether the Due 
Process clause applies to certification processes. 
The Supreme Court has tended to narrow the defi-
nition of “state action” to which the clause applies 
in recent years.37 But it is not entirely clear that the 
rulemaking and adjudication involved in standard 
setting and certification processes would be exempt. 
Thus, it is at least conceivable that certifiers would 
have to meet due process standards if certification 
were state mandated. That might not be particularly 
difficult, however, since Due Process requirements 
generally are not stringent, and since many nomi-
nally private organizations have already incorpo-
rated comparable procedures.38 In the statutory 
realm, it seems likely that, on their own terms, stat-
utes such as the federal Administrative Procedure 
Act and similar state acts would not be held to ap-
ply to certification processes. Nothing, however, 
would preclude legislatures from making them 
applicable, and it seems likely that if states chose to 
more control over the reg-neg process than described in the text, but this 
is not a constitutional requirement. 
35 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upholding a California statute fixing 
the price of raisins). 
36 California Retail Liquor Dealer’s Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U.S. at 97 (1980) (defining the clear statement and state supervision crite-
ria). Absent such active state involvement, however, firms participating in 
self-regulatory standard setting do face risks of anti-trust liability. See, 
e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 
(1988) (holding the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a non-
governmental standard setting organization, liable for anti-trust violations, 
when steel manufacturers used its processes to prevent approval of plas-
tic conduit as an alternative to steel in the NFPA’s National Electrical 
Code, which was subsequently adopted by many governmental bodies). 
37 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 30.; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization and 
the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act: Furthering Democracy and the 
Global Public Interest, Bloomington Snyder Lecture, Lauterpacht Center 
for International Research, University of Cambridge, February 3, 1999. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=176691 Copy on file with 
author. 
38 See generally, Lauren Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational 
Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 
95 AM. J. of SOC. 1401 (1990). There are complex problems in standard 
setting organizations, however, some of which do not provide the equiva-
lent of notice and comment rulemaking, or do limit participation those with 
direct, material interests. See generally John P. Shoaf, “Business as 
Usual or an Instance of Reinvention and Privatization in Environmental 
Rulemaking? New Rules and Issues with the Use of Voluntary Consensus 
Standards,” May 25, 1999, at 31. Copy on file with author.. 
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require regulated industries to achieve certification 
they could eventually be persuaded to subject certi-
fication systems to administrative law-like proce-
dural requirements.39 
b) Official promotion of certification 
Rather than “sticks,” governments can use “carrots” 
to promote preferred policies. Given their ability to 
avert legal and political challenges based on dele-
gation of lawmaking powers while still altering 
environmental practices, government-provided 
incentives could turn out to be the preferred policy 
instrument for promoting certification. Several large 
U.S. administrative agencies either are considering 
or have made ISO 14001 certification one of their 
purchasing criteria.40 The EPA has promulgated a 
number of policies that explicitly or implicitly pro-
mote certification. Its enforcement policies, for 
example, while not directed solely at certification 
systems, indicate that environmental certification 
will be viewed as a positive factor in reviewing 
organizational compliance records.41 EPA’s Office 
of Compliance Assurance and Monitoring is inte-
grating environmental management system ele-
ments into its enforcement protocols and settlement 
criteria.42 The agency has also used ISO 14001 in 
several of its Project XL multimedia permitting 
processes.43 EPA has published several documents 
and handbooks assisting and promoting develop-
ment of ISO 14000-style management systems for 
both industry and for local governments,44 and has 
supported research in support of the further de-
ployment of environmental management systems.45 
The Federal Sentencing Commission has also pro-
vided that criminal defendants with “environmental 
39 See Section 3 infra. 
40 The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy require ISO 
14001 certification for first and second-level suppliers. (Second level sup-
pliers are those who provide supplies to firms which actually supply prod-
ucts to the agencies.) Stenzel, supra note 29 at 270. 
41 USEPA, Audit Policy: Incentives for Self-Policing, 60 Federal Register 
66706 (December 22, 1995) ("Where violations are found through volun-
tary environmental audits or efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due 
diligence, and are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA 
will not seek gravity-based (i.e., noneconomic benefit) penalties and will 
generally not recommend criminal prosecution against the regulated en-
tity."). 
42 USEPA Draft EMS Action Plan for Public Comment, December 20, 1999 
http://www.epa.gov/ems/plan99.htm 
43 The most recent is with Imation Enterprises Corporation, the world’s 
largest manufacturer of magnetic data storage tapes. Id at 15. 
44 E.g., EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, Enviromental Man-
agement Systems. http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/dfe/tools/ems/ems.html ; 
EPA Office of Wastewater Management, Environmental Management 
Systems: An Implementation Guide for Small and Medium-Sized Organi-
zations, http://www.epa.gov/owmitnet/wm046200.htm 
45 E.g., Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems and 
ISO 14001 and a Request for Comments on the Nature of the Data To Be 
Collected From Environmental Management System/ISO 14001 Pilots, 63 
Federal Register 12094-12097 (March 12, 1998) 
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAL/1998/March/Day-
12/g6389.htm 
compliance programs,” which many certification 
programs would probably qualify as, can have their 
sentences significantly reduced.46 Even the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation has published 
draft guidance indicating that an ISO 1400 man-
agement system will help project sponsors demon-
strate environmental monitoring and management 
capacity meeting its requirements for support.47 
One of the most direct efforts to promote certifica-
tion occurred recently at the state level, when Con-
necticut passed an “Act Concerning Exemplary 
Environmental Management Systems.” The Act 
provides special benefits to companies that have: 
(1) registered ISO 14001 environmental manage-
ment systems, (2) adopted approved principles of 
sustainability, and (3) good compliance records. 
The benefits include: (1) expedited permit review, 
(2) reduced fees, (3) less frequent reporting, (4) 
facility wide permits for approved firms, and (5) 
public recognition of having attained this achieve-
ment.48 While it is difficult to track developments 
like this, other states might well adopt similar leg-
islation. Whether they do or not, it is important to 
remember that favorable treatment of certified firms 
is only part of the government enforcement package 
that will best promote certification. The other part is 
effective enforcement of the environmental laws, 
which minimizes the relative economic disadvan-
tages of certification for firms. 
Government agencies can also promote the expan-
sion of private certification programs by subjecting 
themselves to them. A number of state and local 
agencies responsible for managing public forests 
have had their forests certified. Some have chosen 
the more environmentally and socially demanding 
FSC program,49 others the somewhat less protective 
American Forest and Paper Association program.50 
46 See Tom Tibor & Ira Feldman, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 226 (1995); see also 
Organization Sentencing Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762, § 8A1.2, 
Comment K (U.S. Sentencing Comm. 1991); Draft Corporate Guidelines 
for Environmental Violations, §§ 9C1.2, 9D1.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm. 
1993). 
47 United States International Development Cooperation Agency (ICDA), 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Request for Comments 
on Draft Environmental Handbook; Notice, 63 FR 9696 (1998). 
48 Connecticut State Statutes. 
http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/Act/pa/1999PA-00226-R00HB-06830-
PA.htm. This provision, like much of the other information in this article, 
came to my attention through the “voluntary codes” list-serve maintained 
by Kernaghan Webb. This is an invaluable source of information, and can 
be accessed at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00973e.html . 
49 Thus far, the agencies responsible for managing state-owned lands in 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and New York have either achieved FSC certifi-
cation or announced that they intend to do so. Margaret Higgins, New 
York forests get green thumbs-up, Environmental News Network, Febru-
ary 5, 2000, http://www.enn.com/enn-news-
archive/2000/02/02052000/certification_9680.asp 
50 E.g., Itaska and Lake County Minnesota. 
http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/sfi/sfi_license.html 
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The federal land management agencies appear to 
have no near term intention of seeking third party 
certification of their lands.51 The EPA, by contrast, 
has put a considerable effort into promoting the use 
of ISO-style environmental management systems at 
all levels of government, including its own opera-
tions and those of other agencies.52 
c) Express adoption of the same or substantially 
similar standards 
As noted above, independent enactment of certifi-
cation standards would be one way of avoiding 
delegation doctrine problems. Because the states 
and the federal government share authority over 
environmental protection, adoption of certification 
standards could occur at either level. Moreover, it 
could be done either by legislatures, or by adminis-
trative agencies with broad substantive and proce-
dural mandates. At the legislative level, no evidence 
of formal adoption of environmental certification 
standards has come to light during the preparation 
of this paper.53 In the past, moreover, many other 
types of privately generated standards have been 
adopted by North American legislatures.54 Given 
the inherent attractiveness of ready-made standards, 
environmental certification system standards seem 
likely to become increasingly important in federal 
and state legislative processes over time. As that 
happens, legislatures will doubtless be tempted to 
change private standards to reflect their particular 
concerns, as they have done with model legislation 
in other areas such as criminal and product liability 
law.55 On the other hand, pressure for inter-
jurisdictional consistency in standards is growing, 
and privately generated international environmental 
standards could prove quite robust.56 
51 Forest Stewardship Council United States, Federal Lands Policy State-
ment Concerning FSC-Endorsed Certification on U.S. Federal Lands. 
http://www.fscus.org/current_issues/federallands.html 
52 See generally, USEPA Draft EMS Action Plan for Public Comment, 
December 20, 1999 http://www.epa.gov/ems/plan99.htm; USEPA, Code 
of Environmental Management Principles for Federal Agencies, 61 Fed-
eral Register 54061-54066 (October 16, 1996). 
53 However, Bolivia recently adopted forestry standards virtually identical to 
the FSC standards. Personal Communication, Dr. Dietrich Burger, For-
estry Program, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(German Organization for Technical Cooperation), Eschborn. 
54 See generally, Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental 
Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting 
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329-1484 (1978). State and local 
legislatures have also adopted uncounted private codes in such areas as 
plumbing, construction, accounting practices, and the like. Id. 
55 Examples include the Model Penal Code, the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Restatements of Torts and Contracts, and the like. 
56 The question of how much demand there is for inter-jurisdictional consis-
tency is in fact quite complex. While some industrial interests operating in 
multiple legal jurisdictions have powerful interests in uniform standards, 
others, either operating in a narrower set of jurisdictions or having more 
capacity to vary performance according to locale, have equally strong 
interests in differential standards, which they have a comparative advan-
tages in meeting. 
At the administrative level, U.S. agencies have a 
long history of incorporating privately generated 
standards in public regulations. Sometimes the 
private standards are small elements of rules cov-
ering larger topics, as in a Federal Trade Commis-
sion rule incorporating the American Society for 
Testing and Materials’ standard for measuring 
gasoline octane in a rule requiring sellers to post 
octane ratings on their pumps.57 Other times agency 
rules are aimed at essentially the same issues as the 
private standards. When the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administrative began operations in 
1971, for example, it quickly converted a whole raft 
of private health and safety standards into regula-
tory requirements.58 Other agencies have done the 
same.59 It is clear that EPA has often drawn upon 
private standards in setting regulatory requirements, 
but there appear to be no published studies provid-
ing a comprehensive overview of how it has done 
this. In addition, National Technology Transfer and 
Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) requires that 
federal agencies “use technical standards that are 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus bod-
ies” and participate in their development where 
possible. 60 The exact reach of the statute remains 
open to interpretation, particularly because it does 
not define key terms such as “technical standard” 
and “voluntary consensus body.”61 Nonetheless, it 
seems likely to exert a steady pull that on agency 
practice over time. 
It is also important to note that some of the emerg-
ing private environmental standards might be diffi-
cult for agencies to incorporate, because they in-
clude areas beyond the jurisdiction of any single 
57 See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Association v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
58 The OSHA’s review of private standards was not always stellar, and it 
sometimes mandated standards that were either poorly developed or 
obsolete, such as a rule against ice in drinking water that derived from the 
days when all ice was obtained from frozen lakes and rivers. On the other 
hand, it also achieved considerable successes by using private standards. 
See generally, Hamilton, supra note 54. Though over twenty years old, 
this study remains one of the few serious pieces of research ever to have 
been done on regulatory incorporation of privately set standards in the 
U.S. 
59 Id. 
60 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 
3701 (1996). The statute requires agencies to utilize voluntary standards 
unless doing so would be “inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical,” 
and to report decisions not to use such standards to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget. 
61 For a careful analysis of the statute and its possible effects on environ-
mental regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency, see Shoaf, 
supra note 38. It is also important to note that the Office of Management 
and Budget has promulgated a revised version of Circular A-119, which 
seeks to provide guidance to executive branch agencies on how to im-
plement the Act. OMB Circular A-119, “Federal Participation in the Devel-
opment and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity 
Assessment Activities,” 63 Fed. Reg. 8545 (1998). Shoaf’s analysis ex-
plores an number of important ambiguities in the reach of the statute in 
terms of what kinds of what kinds of standards and standard setting bod-
ies are promoted by the statute. 
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agency. The FSC standards, for example, include 
indigenous rights, worker safety, and community 
economic concerns, in addition to environmental 
protection -- concerns well beyond the jurisdiction 
of any single agency. Although some federal and 
state administrative agencies have been trying to 
achieve cross-agency policy coordination in recent 
years, the going has been very difficult.62 This 
could conceivably mean either that non-
governmental programs have a significant long-
term structural advantage over governmental ones, 
or that their efforts to integrate multiple concerns 
are too far ahead of governmental programs to be 
attractive to most industries. 
Overall, the quality of legislative and administrative 
deliberation in adopting private standards has varied 
tremendously in different situations. Sometimes the 
legal bodies have carefully reviewed, evaluated, and 
appropriately amended, private standards, other 
times they have not.63 When administrative agen-
cies incorporate standards, they are subject to judi-
cial review and must produce decisional records 
sufficient to persuade reviewing courts that their 
decisions were rational and based on adequate evi-
dence.64 The NTTAA may make it somewhat easier 
for agency rules incorporating private standards to 
sustain judicial review, since it expresses a general 
preference for such standards, and puts a special 
burden on agencies to explain decisions in which 
they choose not to use them. 
d) Indirect adoption through “environmental” laws 
Some of the most important and difficult-to-trace 
forms of legal change unfold in informal processes. 
These processes include broad discussions in in-
dustrial, professional, and policy circles,65 as well 
specific transactions among firms, regulators,66 and 
62 See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Organizational and Legal Challenges for 
Ecosystem Management. In Kathryn A. Kohm and Jerry F. Franklin, eds., 
CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE SCIENCE 
OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, Chapter 23 (1997). 
63 Hamilton, supra note 54. It appears to be extremely common for state 
legislatures to include private standards in legislation by reference, some-
times providing that changes in the standards will automatically be man-
dated by the legislation. Id. 
64 Several Consumer Product Safety Commission rules based on pre-
existent standards, for example, failed the ‘substantial evidence’ test on 
judicial review. Id at 1401. Absent statutory directives to the contrary, 
agency rules are subject to the nominally less stringent “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard under APA Section 706(2)(a), though there is dis-
agreement among scholars about whether there is really any difference 
between the two review standards. 
65 An example is the growth of the field of “industrial ecology.” See, e.g., 
Robert U. and Leslie W. Ayers, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY: TOWARDS 
CLOSING THE MATERIAL CYCLE (1996) and Thomas E. Graedel and 
Braden R. Allenby, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY (1995). 
66 See for example the negotiations described by Keith Hawkins, 
ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE 
SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984). 
sometimes community organizations.67 It seems 
quite likely that the private environmental certifica-
tion programs will affect regulatory programs 
through these almost invisible channels, beyond 
whatever changes are promulgated as official pol-
icy. Some of tacit changes are likely to occur as 
inspectors evaluate practices at industrial facilities 
and question whether firms are following best prac-
tices. Others may come into play when permits go 
through revision cycles, and regulators or public 
interest groups push for up-to-date standards. 
Regulatory officials can also promote private stan-
dards in their choices of which firms to inspect and 
monitor. Thus, they might decide to treat certifica-
tion as an indicator of strong performance, and to 
concentrate their enforcement efforts on other 
firms.68 As it became apparent in an industry that 
certified firms were likely to suffer fewer or less 
intensive inspections, or to find it easier to get nec-
essary regulatory approvals, the standard of practice 
in the industry would likely converge with that of 
the certification program. 
In the Canadian legal system certification standards 
may play an additional indirect role in shaping 
environmental regulatory standards. Regulated 
firms are subject to “strict liability.” To convict, the 
government need simply show that a firm violated a 
standard, and offer no evidence about the overall 
quality of its management. The firm can counter 
with a “due diligence” defense, which involves 
showing that the defendant exercised reasonable 
care under the circumstances.69 At least one Ontario 
court has treated failure to receive industry certifi-
cation as failure of the due diligence defense.70 
Certification standards have also been incorporated 
67 For a description of community participation see R. Nils Olsen, Jr., The 
Concentration of Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities in the Western 
New York Community, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 473 (1991). 
68 The appropriateness of preferential treatment for certified firms should not 
be presumed, however. At present there appears to be little empirical 
evidence that firms in certification programs generally perform better than 
uncertified firms. In the American Responsible Care program, in fact, it 
appears that participants have reduced their pollution discharges no more 
quickly, and possibly more slowly, than non-participants. Andrew King and 
Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: the Chemical 
Industry’s Responsible Care Program, ACAD. OF MGMT. J. (forthcom-
ing). The authors hypothesize that this may reflect several factors, includ-
ing the possible attractions of participation as a “smoke screen” for poorly 
performing firms and the failure of the program to apply significant sanc-
tions to date. They note that the program is considering taking stronger 
action against poor performers and the possibility of implementing a third-
party verification program to replace the current self-verification program. 
They also indicate that increased external scrutiny, whether by govern-
ment, NGOs, or community members, could stimulate significant im-
provements in the effectiveness of the program. 
69 Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiatives and the Law, in R. Gibson, ed., 
VOLUNTARY 
INITIATIVES: THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING, at 32-
50 (1999) at 33. 
70 R. v. Domtar, O.J. No. 3415 (Ont.C.J., Gen. Div.) (1993), as cited in 
Webb, id. 
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into law through remedies. In another Canadian 
case involving a violation of air pollution standards 
the defendant proposed, and the judge accepted, a 
remedy requiring the defendant to achieve ISO 
14001 certification. Of course, such certification 
was not a requirement of the regulations involved, 
but was incorporated through the equitable powers 
of the judge to impose an appropriate remedy.71 
Finally, it should also be noted that international 
environmental law may become an important 
source of indirect incorporation of private stan-
dards. Discussions about how to implement the 
Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of greenhouse 
gasses, for example, include the possibility of using 
FSC forest certification to verify the maintenance of 
carbon retention “sinks,”72 as well as using ISO 
14000 management systems to achieve reductions 
in of greenhouse gas emissions.73 What role such 
mechanisms will in fact play remains open at pres-
ent, but their proponents are actively promoting 
them as important tools for attacking global climate 
change. 
In all of the above ways, certification programs can 
be incorporated implicitly into legal systems with-
out going through formal legislative or rulemaking 
processes. They effectively change the definition of 
proper behavior and increase the rewards for com-
pliance with certification standards and the penal-
ties for non-compliance. Given the paucity of em-
pirical research in the area, it is unclear how often 
they are doing so. Yet it is clear that we need to 
carefully survey such indirect processes if we are to 
understand the incorporation of private initiatives in 
law. 
e) Indirect adoption through “non-environmental”
laws 
 
Environmental certification standards can also be 
incorporated into legal systems through nominally 
non-environmental laws. This section lists some key 
areas where this is likely to happen. 
i)Tort Law 
Tort law sets standards for liability between parties 
who have not dealt with potential liability issues by 
contractual or other means. It usually applies to 
71 R. v. Prospec Chemicals Ltd., A.J. No. 174 Alta. Prov. Ct. (Jan. 25, 1996). 
As cited in Webb, id. The judge required the defendant to post a bond of 
$40,000 subject to forfeiture if the company failed to comply with the certi-
fication order. 
72 Forest Stewardship Council, “Background Paper for FSC and Carbon 
Certification Workshop,” FSC Website: 
http://www.fscoax.org/html/assembly_general/carbon_bkgd.htm 
73 ISO Technical Committee 207 Climate Change Task Force, “Application 
of the ISO 140000 Series of Standards to the Issue of Global Climate 
Change, Draft Third Interim Report, June 2000 (Document Reference: 
ISO TC 207 CCTF N29R3). 
“accidents,” often but not always between strangers. 
In general, American tort law requires parties who 
fail to follow standards of “reasonable care” to 
compensate those who are foreseeably injured as a 
result. Certification standards can be expected to 
infuse several different areas of tort law. 
 (1) Toxic torts 
The most obvious arena for potential incorporation 
is that of toxic torts, which involves liability for 
damage resulting from exposure to toxic environ-
mental agents. The agents are usually chemicals, 
but can be biological organisms as well.74 Certifi-
cation standards are most likely to apply to the 
question of what constitutes reasonable care. Both 
substantive and management system standards have 
the potential for raising requirements. Consider the 
example of a firm that releases a toxic agent into a 
community and claims non-liability on grounds that 
its practices conformed to government regulations75 
and industry standards. Plaintiffs could argue that 
the firm’s lack of an ISO 14001 management sys-
tem constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care 
under the circumstances. Such an argument would 
be difficult for a defendant to counter, especially in 
light of the fact that a harmful release occurred. 
Often the most difficult elements to prove in toxic 
tort suits are injury and causation. Environmental 
certification systems have the potential to aid plain-
tiffs in these areas too, since they may require firms 
to gather and maintain data on a broad array of 
environmental effects. These data would probably 
be subject to discovery by plaintiffs in a law suit in 
many jurisdictions, and could help show chains of 
causation and injury. Although some states have 
enacted statutes to protect companies from compul-
sory disclosure of information generated in prepar-
ing voluntary environmental audits, such as would 
be done for ISO 14001 certification, many states 
and the federal government have not enacted such 
statutes.76 
(2) Negligence 
Certification standards might also change liability 
standards for run-of-the-mill, non-toxic accidents. 
Consider the example of an auto accident triggered 
74 See e.g., Gene J. Heady, Stuck Inside These Four Walls: Recognition of 
Sick Building Syndrome Has Laid the Foundation to Raise Toxic Tort 
Litigation to New Heights,” 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1041, 1053 (1995). 
75 This is sometimes called the “regulatory compliance” defense. On the 
whole, American courts have tended not to defer to regulatory standards 
in tort cases. They have been criticized for this tendency in recent years, 
and doctrine in the area may be undergoing some change. See generally, 
Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L. J. 
(2000) (forthcoming). 
76 Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy 
Under the ISO 14000 International Environmental Management Stan-
dards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 191-205 (1997). 
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by road damage resulting from slumping earth 
where a firm harvested timber on steep slopes. 
Although government regulations might permit it, 
and other firms might engage in similar harvesting, 
prohibition by a program such as that of the FSC 
could be taken as persuasive evidence of failure to 
exercise due care.77 Again note that the firm could 
be liable whether it was certified or not. Thus law 
would operate to extend “voluntary” standards to 
non-participants. 
(3) Nuisance 
General standards for land use in Anglo-American 
law are defined through the law of nuisance, which 
generally prohibits uses of land which “substan-
tially” and “unreasonably” interfere with the use 
and enjoyment of land by others.78 Just what is 
unreasonable is hard to define, and depends on 
many factors (common practices in the area, prior-
ity in time, costs and benefits of the use, etc.). It is 
possible to anticipate, however, that in some in-
stances certification standards, particularly substan-
tive ones, could be called upon to define land uses 
as unreasonable. To offer a forestry example again, 
stream pollution which results from a clear cut 
larger than would be allowed by a certification 
system and which substantially affects the water 
quality of a downstream owner could potentially be 
cited as unreasonable, and enjoined by a court. The 
same might be true of air pollution suffered by 
downwind residents from a non-certified chemical 
plant. 
(4) Misrepresentation 
American tort law has long provided a cause of 
action to anyone physically injured as a result of 
reasonable reliance on a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion made by one who is in the business of selling a 
product.79 The common law requirement of physical 
harm is likely to limit the number of plaintiffs who 
can bring general common law actions involving 
certification programs,80 but it is conceivable that 
some physical harm might result from misrepre-
77 Though the issue is not central to this article, note that the converse is 
also possible. Someone injured by a product or enterprise that met a pri-
vately set standard could sue the standard setting organization in tort. 
Although American courts tradtionally eschew such suits, some important 
ones have been successful. See Shoaf, supra note 38 at 38 for an over-
view. See also Jeffrey Q. Smith, Jeanne P. Bolger and Amy Marasco, 
Products Liability Claims Against Voluntary Standards Developers -- An 
Update on Recent Developments, American National Standards Institute 
Website: http://web.ansi.org/public/library/guides/prod_liability.html. 
78 See generally, Prosser and Keeton, LAW OF TORTS (5th Ed, 1984). 
79 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 
Section 42B (1998) (“one engaged in the business of selling or otherwise 
distributing products who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes 
a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of a material fact 
concerning the product is subject to liability for harm to persons or prop-
erty caused by the misrepresentation.”) 
80 Id, Section 21. 
sentation of fact such as certification status and give 
rise to suits outside of the negligence framework.81 
In any case, related statutory provisions regarding 
misrepresentation clearly provide actions for eco-
nomic harm. The most important is a broadly 
worded provision of the federal “Lanham Act,” 
creating general liability for commercial misrepre-
sentation of goods or services to either competitors 
or others who are damaged.82 It seems clear that this 
provision could be used in suits against firms said to 
be misrepresenting their certification status. It is 
even possible that it might be used against firms 
who claim to be managing their forests sustainably, 
but are not certified. Such suits could conceivably 
be brought by competitors who are certified, and 
who claim that their competitors are falsely imply-
ing that they are as well.83 Suits under this provision 
will certainly be worth watching! In addition, the 
Federal Trade Commission and various state attor-
neys general have the authority to brings suits 
against companies for commercial misrepresenta-
tion, and have often done so.84 
ii)Property Law 
American property law allows land owners to make 
environmental management commitments that will 
continue to be binding even if the land comes under 
new ownership. One of the most important forms is 
the “conservation easement,” through which an 
owner, while retaining possession of the land and 
the right to use it in many ways, can make specific 
commitments to another party regarding how the 
land will be used.85 That party, which ordinarily 
81 There have certainly been suits for misrepresentation of human rights 
records. One brought against clothing manufacturers operating in Saipan, 
for example, contributed to a fairly far reaching settlement monitored by 
an American not-for-profit organization. Monitoring Program: A Plan for 
Implementing Settlement on Apparel Production in Saipan 
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/corporations/saipan/monitoring.h 
tml 
82 Originally passed in 1946, the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision 
was amended in 1988 to read as follows: “Any person who, on or in con-
nection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description 
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person, or in commercial advertising or pro-
motion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 
origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial 
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that 
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(1) 
(1994). 
83 For examples of the many kinds of suits that have been brought by 
competitors under the Lanham Act, see Jean Wegman Burns, Confused 
Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 29 B.U.L.REV. 
807(1999). 
84 See Lee Goldman, The World’s Best Article on Competitor Suits for False 
Advertising, 45 FLA. L.R. 487, 505-506 (1993). 
85 The Uniform Conservation Easement Act defines a conservation ease-
ment as “[a] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing 
80 
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must be a governmental or a not-for-profit organi-
zation, holds the “benefit” of the easement. It has 
the power to determine whether the commitments 
are being met, and to take action to enforce them if 
they are not. Certification appears to be an excellent 
way of enforcing the kinds of conservation ease-
ments which allow continued management for for-
estry, but prohibit overcutting, reductions of biodi-
versity, and the like. Using certification as an en-
forcement mechanism would considerably reduce 
the burden on benefit holders, and provide a “neu-
tral,” third-party assessment of how well the bur-
dens of the easement are being met. Accordingly, it 
seems likely that drafters of conservation easements 
will discover the benefits of certification and begin 
incorporating them in the agreements. 
iii)Tax Law 
Tax law could also become an important means of 
incorporating certification in the legal system. Con-
servation easements, for example, are often donated 
or sold to conservation organizations for very low 
prices. If the price received is less than the reduc-
tion in property value resulting from the transfer of 
the easement,86 that difference can qualify as a 
charitable deduction under federal income tax law87 
and may bring additional tax benefits under state 
laws. Given the creativity of tax lawyers in arguing 
for deductions generally, it seems likely that other 
avenues in tax law will be probed in order to im-
prove the financial benefits of certification. 
iv)Information Regulation 
As the Lanham Act indicates, U.S. law tends to 
treat information relatively seriously.88 One very 
important statute in the environmental arena is the 
“community right to know” law, which requires 
users of specified toxic and hazardous chemicals to 
file annual reports disclosing names and quantities 
of chemicals either stored on site or released into 
limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retain-
ing or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, 
assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space 
use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water 
quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cul-
tural aspects of real property.” Unif. Conserv. Easement Act, § 1(1) 
(1981). The easement document ordinarily defines in much greater detail 
which uses will be allowed and which will not. See, e.g., Janet Kiehl and 
Thomas Barrett, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 
(1988). The easement is recorded in the file on the property which is 
maintained by the central registry in the local jurisdiction where the prop-
erty is located. 
86 Conservation easements are generally expected to reduce the market 
value of property because they transfer some of its development potential 
away from the property. 
87 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (1994) 
88 One possibly important exception is continuing reliance on industry self-
regulation in the area of electronic commerce. This area remains very 
dynamic, and it is not clear either whether industry self-regulation will 
persist or whether it will have a significant influence on other areas. 
the air, land, or water.89 Other laws require addi-
tional reporting of information on water and air 
pollution. Information reported under these statutes 
is generally available to the public from state and 
federal environmental agencies. Although it can be 
poorly coordinated and difficult to analyze, the 
value and accessibility of this information are likely 
to improve steadily as agencies implement modern, 
internet-oriented information systems. Moreover, if 
certification programs deliver on their promise to 
improve information production, management, and 
analysis in firms, those improvements may be re-
flected over time in the rules governing public dis-
closure requirements. Finally, public reporting laws 
are likely to be important aids to public and private 
monitoring of the implementation of environmental 
certification programs in firms. By creating external 
capacity to compare certified firms to each other 
and to uncertified firms, it may also provide extra 
leverage for those pushing firms to become certified 
and certification programs to become stringent.90 
v)Financial Regulation 
U.S. financial regulation may be even more reliant 
on information disclosure than environmental 
regulation. Because the economic prospects of firms 
can be heavily affected by their environmental 
performance, financial regulation also has consider-
able potential to reinforce certification standards. 
Corporate disclosures are regulated both by detailed 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regu-
lations, and by the general “anti-fraud” provisions 
of the securities laws, as well as by state laws. At 
present, the formal requirements of SEC rules are 
not particularly demanding regarding environmental 
issues. They tend to focus on potential legal liabili-
ties of firms, and accord firms considerable discre-
tion in deciding what to report.91 However, certified 
firms are free to report their status, and many will 
do so. Such information is valuable both to general 
analysts assessing the likely profitability of firms 
and to green consumers seeking to distinguish be-
tween investment options based on environmental 
performance. SEC regulations mandate “generally 
accepted accounting principles,” which are largely 
established by the profession itself through its own 
89 42 U.S.C. § § 11022 and 11023. 
90 The King and Lennox research on the American Responsible Care 
program indicates to potential power of public information reporting in 
assessing the effectiveness of certification programs. Andrew King and 
Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical 
Industry's Responsible Care Program, ACAD. OF MGNT. J. (forthcoming). 
Copy on file with author. 
91 See generally, John W. Bagby, Paula C. Murray, and Eric T. Andrews, So 
How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environ-
mental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (1995). 
81 
                                                          
elni 1/2000 Environmental Law Network International 
private standards setting process.92 While the long 
term existence and relative success of this division 
of responsibility suggests the potential of environ-
mental certification programs, the immediately 
relevant point is that it provides a potential mecha-
nism for incorporating certification status into fi-
nancial reporting. Whether and how this will hap-
pen remains to be seen. An important trend, how-
ever, is that financial reporting standards relating to 
environmental performance are currently subject to 
increased attention and debate in the U.S.93 The 
critique that reporting standards are overly conser-
vative regarding environmental performance ap-
pears to be gaining ground. To the extent that it 
prevails, both formally and informally, financial 
reporting may become an increasingly important 
channel for legal incorporation of environmental 
certification in the future. 
vi)Trade Law 
The U.S. is signatory to a number of international 
trade treaties, including the series of agreements 
referred to as the General Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (GATT). The GATT requires, 
among other things, that “where technical regula-
tions are required and relevant international stan-
dards exist or their completion is imminent, Mem-
bers shall use them . . . as a basis for technical 
regulations.”94 While this provision pushes gov-
ernments to formally incorporate international stan-
dards in their positive laws, the GATT is also likely 
to have broader informal incorporation effects over 
time. By presumptively privileging international 
standards, the GATT may give private international 
environmental standard setting programs implicit 
legal standing regardless of whether their standards 
formally incorporated in state laws. This is espe-
cially so because the World Trade Organization, the 
GATT’s primary trade regulation body, has found it 
extremely difficult to promulgate rules to date.95 
This situation virtually invites private international 
standard setting bodies to fill the vacuum as quickly 
as possible. 
92 The standard setting process is organized through the Financial Stan-
dards Accounting Board, which also has an Emerging Issues Task Force 
that deals with problems such as those in the changeable field of envi-
ronmental accounting and reporting. Id at 306-7. 
93 Id. See also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 
(1999). 
94 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Basic Documents of Inter-
national Economic Law, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 141 (Commerce Clearing House, 
1994). 
95 See, e.g., Marco Bronkers, Better Rules for a New Millennium: A Warning 
Against Undemocratic Developments in the WTO, 2 J. INT. BUS. L. 547 
(1999). 
f) Forbearance 
What does it mean when state legal systems take no 
direct action regarding private certification sys-
tems? Inaction is to be expected when certification 
systems are new and government has little experi-
ence with them. After certification programs be-
come better understood, however, government 
forbearance may begin to take on meaning. Most 
likely it will be taken to indicate tacit approval. It 
could even be seen as an implicit delegation of 
regulatory authority to the program. In practice, of 
course, it might simply be the case that legislatures 
and agencies see more pressing needs for scarce 
government resources in other areas. Intentionally 
or not, however, government forbearance could 
grow into a form of tacit delegation over time, 
making it increasingly unlikely that government 
will significantly expand its regulatory presence in 
the areas. Assuming there remains a societal ex-
pectation that some program is necessary, govern-
ment forbearance may thus contribute to the long-
term strengthening of environmental certification 
programs. Institutionally oriented scholars would 
see them as having been incorporated into the social 
control system of which the formal legal system 
forms a part. That would have been accomplished 
with the assistance of the legal system by its essen-
tially doing nothing! 
3 Legal Control of Certification Systems 
Legal systems can shape certification systems, and 
not merely incorporate them. Indeed, many of the 
legal incorporation mechanisms described above 
may affect the content and practice of certification 
as well. Certification systems are likely to be 
shaped in part with an eye to how legal systems 
may react. 
a) Informal Steering 
While government forbearance may be seen as a 
tacit form of approval or delegation, it can also be a 
tactical strategy for “steering” the development of 
certification programs. Regulatory officials and 
certification officials are likely to observe each 
other’s behavior. Government agencies are likely to 
be able to affect the substance and implementation 
of certification programs to some extent simply by 
how they signal they “might” react to them. Of 
course, this is simply the mirror image of certifica-
tion programs trying to steer government policy, but 
it is important to note the capacity of government to 
affect programs by doing nothing yet giving signals 
about what it might do. 
Governments might also be able to steer certifica-
tion programs by providing them with technical 
expertise, by actively participating in them, or by 
supporting research on their performance, all of 
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which the U.S. is doing.96 In particular, they could 
gather and support the analysis of data regarding the 
relative performance of certification programs and 
firms within them. Governments can thereby si-
multaneously hedge their policy bets and enhance 
the transparency of certification programs. By thus 
facilitating increased production and dissemination 
of information, they may also increase the learning 
capacity of the regulatory system as a whole. 
b) Direct Regulation 
Should informal steering not suffice, governments 
always have the option of regulating certification 
programs.97 They might do this in a number of 
ways. First, they could redefine the substantive 
management standards which must be met by firms 
seeking to be certified.98 Of course such an action 
would pose a dilemma for certification programs, 
particularly global ones, and they would have to 
decide whether to remain in business in the juris-
diction, try to get the law changed, ignore it, etc. 
Second, governments could impose rules governing 
the procedures followed by certification programs --
standard setting processes, certification processes, 
enforcement processes, etc. They might, for exam-
ple, require more or different kinds of public par-
ticipation in certification proceedings.99 They might 
require the disclosure of information that designers 
of certification processes planned not to disclose. 
Given the discretion vested in certifiers by many 
private certification schemes, governments might 
also decide to define minimum qualifications for 
certifiers. In fact, governments could go so far as 
develop public certification standards for private 
certification programs! Note that the Connecticut 
law discussed above carries the seeds of such possi-
bilities within it. 
There are many more possibilities. Two points 
should be kept in mind. First, certification programs 
96 Shoaf, supra note 38. See also General Accounting Office, “Certification 
Requirements: New Guidance Should Encourage Transparency in Agency 
Decision Making,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Small Business, 
House of Representatives, GAO/GCD-99-179 (September, 1999). 
97 The federal government, for example, has passed a statutory framework 
authorizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the certification 
of organic foods. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA), 7 U.S.C. 
§6501 (2000). The department has yet to promulgate final standards un-
der the Act, so many states have enacted their own programs. J. Howard 
Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Biotechnology 
and the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 105, 117 
(2000). See e.g. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 5h-19.004 (2000); IOWA 
AMIN. CODE 21-47.1(190C) (2000). 
98 It should also be noted that the standards for certified firms could continue 
to be different from those for non-certified firms. 
99 Indeed, the American anti-trust laws already do so to some degree, by 
favoring standard setting processes that are open, balanced, and trans-
parent. See generally, David A. Swankin, How Due Process in the Devel-
opment of Voluntary Consensus Standards Can Reduce the Risk of Anti-
trust Liability, Prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Inst. Of 
Standards and Tech., NIST-GCR-90-571 (1990); Shoaf, supra note 38. 
perform public functions, functions which are most 
often carried out by government agencies under the 
types of rules listed above. Second, such forms of 
regulation have been imposed on other private ac-
tors with public responsibilities, such as medical 
professionals,100 accountants,101 lawyers, and so on. 
There is no reason to assume that environmental 
professionals will enjoy permanent immunity. 
c) Inhibition of Certification Systems 
i) National Trade Regulation 
Where industrial firms cooperate to set standards 
governing themselves, potentially raising prices for 
their products or inhibiting entry into their industry, 
national fair trade laws, such as the U.S. anti-trust 
laws, are always likely to be an issue. They have 
received considerable attention in development of 
certification programs to date. Often this attention 
has been private, with certification organizations 
seeking confidential advice from law firms and 
conducting confidential consultations with national 
trade authorities.102 Other times it has been public, 
sometimes when certification programs explain why 
they cannot be more ambitious,103 and sometimes 
when they instruct participants on how to avoid 
anit-trust problems.104 As noted in Section 2, na-
tional trade laws can impose some constraints, but 
do not seem to be a major obstacle to certification 
programs at this time.105 
ii) International Trade Regulation 
The past few years have seen a major expansion in 
the power of the international trading institutions, 
which have used a series of international treaties to 
impose increasingly significant constraints on do-
mestic regulatory programs. The World Trade Or-
ganization is currently responsible for implementing 
global trading policy by interpreting and applying 
100The American health care system, for example, involves a very compli-
cated mix of non-governmental regulation by the Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Hospitals and detailed regulation of the behavior health 
care professionals and specific aspects of health care provision. See, e.g., 
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 Bos. C. 
L. R., 835 (1983) and Steve P. Calandrillo, Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Under Managed Care , 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 72 (1998). 
101 See, e.g., Daniel L. Goelzer and Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(E): 
Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 NW. 
U. L. REV. 652 (1991). 
102 E.g., Webb, supra note 69. 
103 Meidinger, Private Environmental Regulation supra note 3 (describing the 
American Forest & Paper Association’s decision to employ a voluntary 
logger training program, rather than a requirement that all suppliers be 
trained in sustainable forestry methods). 
104 E.g., Swankin, supra note 99. 
105 Their primary effects have been on so-called “buyers groups,” which are 
groups of wholesalers and retailer who jointly commit to buy only certified 
products. These groups have evidently been constrained in various ways 
by trade laws, but no published information has been found that explains 
how. 
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and 
recent important amendments on “technical barriers 
to trade” (TBTs).106 As noted in Section 2, the 
GATT system is likely to be an importation mecha-
nism for legal incorporation of certification sys-
tems. It can also pose some problems, however. The 
main issue facing private certification systems is 
whether they might be classified by the WTO as 
TBTs on grounds that they seek to differentiate 
among similar products based on how they were 
produced. Since the primary targets of the treaties 
are states, some observers question whether private 
certification organizations should be covered at all. 
The TBT amendments do apply to “recognized 
bodies,” however, a term not defined in the 
treaty.107 Kernaghan Webb concludes that an or-
ganization like the ISO, with its designated national 
standards bodies, should be viewed as a recognized 
body, but that groups like the Forest Stewardship 
Council should not. This makes some sense, but is 
also vulnerable based on the analysis of the paper 
thus far. “Recognition” could be given either a 
broad or a narrow interpretation. On the broad side, 
even forbearance from regulating based on an as-
sessment that a certification program is performing 
acceptably could be viewed as recognition. On the 
narrow side, the WTO could conclude that unless a 
state explicitly delegates authority to regulate in a 
field to a certification program, it is not a recog-
nized program. This is another area that will bear 
watching. The effects of the WTO on domestic 
legal incorporation of certification programs could 
be quite significant in years to come. And of course, 
if the WTO is treated as a form of legal system even 
though it is not a nation state, we must ask the 
question to what degree it incorporates certification 
programs. 
4 Conclusions 
a) Patterns of Legal Incorporation 
Certification programs are natural targets for legal 
incorporation because they have elements of for-
mality, continuity, and institutionalization that 
other, ostensibly one-shot industry initiatives may 
not have, and also because they reduce the costs of 
deliberation for legal bodies. Although the incorpo-
ration of certification programs into U.S. law is 
only beginning to unfold, the analysis in Sections 2 
and 3 suggests that it is occurring, mostly through 
indirect legal processes. Yet the process of legal 
106 GATT, supra note 94. 
107 Annex I of the TBT Amendments defines “standard” as a “document 
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes 
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.” GATT, 
supra note 94. 
incorporation is very difficult to monitor. On the 
one hand, it can occur in so many small steps si-
multaneously in so many avenues that it is very 
difficult to trace. It can go forward almost unno-
ticed. On the other hand, there is a tension between 
the quasi-legal analysis performed above and quan-
titative analysis. The facts that the forms of incorpo-
ration described above can occur, and are occurring, 
do not necessarily demonstrate that a widespread 
change is taking place. They indicate that larger 
changes may be occurring, though, and that it is 
appropriate to inquire further. 
b) Implications 
Exactly how to inquire further is not clear. The 
problem is not only how to measure change, but 
also what change to measure. One of the primary 
reasons legal incorporation of certification is inter-
esting is that it may signal larger shifts in social 
governance structures. The challenge is to grasp the 
dimensions of the change that are likely to most 
important. To date, most analysis has focused on 
questions such as whether private environmental 
programs yield environmental performance better 
than would have occurred otherwise, and whether 
they improve cost-effectiveness. Although the an-
swers vary with specific cases, they seem to incline 
toward a cautious “yes.”108 Provided certain safe-
guards are present, such as transparency and watch-
dog groups with the ability to monitor activities, 
environmental and efficiency gains can be 
achieved.109 And of course, the fact that these gains 
are possible may be what impels the establishment 
of certification systems and other private initiatives 
in the first place. 
Yet, other dimensions of change may be equally or 
more important. For example, the proliferation and 
institutionalization of certification systems may 
signal a general shift in political power from some 
actors to others. Who exactly who is gaining and 
losing power? Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, who have 
studied the growth of private authority in a number 
of sectors, conclude that traditional nation states are 
clearly losing ground, while corporate industrial 
interests are gaining.110 They argue that this shift is 
bringing a diminution of public participation and 
accountability.111 In their even more expansive 
study, Braithwaite and Drahos agree that many 
108 E.g., Carlo Carraro and Francois Leveque, eds., VOLUNTARY 
APPROACHES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999). See also the pa-
pers collected at the website on the Second CAVA Workshop on the Effi-
ciency of Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Policy, 
http://www.akf.dk/cava/wp.htm. 
109 Carraro and Leveque, id at 10. 
110 A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, eds., PRIVATE 












                                                          
Environmental Law Network International elni 1/2000 
states are losing ground to corporations and self-
regulatory organizations in the emerging global 
regulatory system.112 They see the system as fluid 
and highly variable, however, depending on the 
particular area of regulation and problem. Actors 
pursue their agendas in significant part by hashing 
out guiding principles, and even relatively small-
scale players encounter a surprising number of 
strategic opportunities to affect the system. None-
theless, the overall pattern is one of increasing con-
trol by large, powerful actors, working as often 
through private governance processes as through 
state ones. 
The growth of a global regulatory system relying 
heavily on private regulation also raises important 
questions about the nature of political legitimacy, 
and whether it might be changing. Received social 
theory holds that to survive governance systems 
must establish significant claims to legitimacy with 
the public. How do private environmental regula-
tory systems do this? One possibility, of course, is 
that people simply do not understand how they 
work or how important they are. While this is true 
of some systems, which pretend to seek transpar-
ency while thwarting it in practice, it is not true of 
all of them. Moreover, the ones reviewed in the 
research underlying this paper seem to be moving 
on the whole toward increased transparency. Thus, 
it seems important to ask whether a new form of 
legitimacy may be emerging, one that is not based 
on traditional political processes managed by the 
state. If so, perhaps it is based on the certification 
systems’ peculiar combination of commitments to 
laudable but diffuse goals, high expertise, selective 
stakeholder participation, and independence from 
government. Plausible or not, this kind of hypothe-
sis has received only the most preliminary explora-
tion to date. If private environmental certification 
systems flourish, such questions will have to be 
addressed.113 
Fourth, as suggested above, voluntary agreements, 
certification programs, and legal incorporation may 
and perhaps should be seen in connection to larger 
developments in society. There has been a certain 
amount of work attempting to make such linkages 
to conventional legal institutions. Some approaches 
focus more on discursive processes in society,114 
112 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 
(2000). They see the U.S. and the European Union, however, as still the 
most powerful actors in the global regulatory system. 
113 It should also be noted that the question of legitimacy plagues both 
private certification systems and supra-national governmental entities, 
such as the WTO and the EU, which also stand in some tension with na-
tion states. See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the 
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: the Example of the Euro-
pean Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999). 
114 E.g., Teubner, supra note 13. 
while others focus on organizational structures and 
patterns of relationships. 115 The next step is to link 
the study of the incorporation of private regulatory 
systems to those constructs. 
Finally, it may be time to revisit the meaning of 
“law” and “legal system.” As the discussion of 
international trade law suggested, the role of the 
nation-state and state-based law is becoming in-
creasingly problematical. It is being challenged 
from one side by the growth of a global trading 
system with an accompanying legal system, and 
from the other by the growth of private, often global 
regulatory mechanisms such as the certification 
systems. Yet the two supposedly defining charac-
teristics of certification systems, their privateness 
and their voluntariness, are highly contingent. They 
are under serious threat as a result of the linkages of 
certification systems to national and transnational 
legal systems. They could turn into their opposites 
before we really notice it. If so, perhaps they were 
not what they seemed. 
Appendix A. Examples of Forest Stewardship 
Council Principles and Standards. 
The Forest Stewardship Principles and Criteria, applica-
ble around the world, are as follows: 
Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of 
the country in which they occur, and international treaties 
and agreements to which the country is a signatory, and 
comply with all FSC Principles and Criteria. 
1. Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and 
forest resources shall be clearly defined, documented 
and legally established. 
2. The legal and customary rights of indigenous peo-
ples to own, use and manage their lands, territories, 
and resources shall be recognized and respected. 
3. Forest management operations shall maintain or 
enhance the long-term social and economic well-
being of forest workers and local communities. 
4. Forest management operations shall encourage the 
efficient use of the forest's multiple products and 
services to ensure economic viability and a wide 
range of environmental and social benefits. 
5. Forest management shall conserve biological diver-
sity and its associated values, water resources, soils, 
and unique and fragile ecosystems and landscapes, 
and, by so doing, maintain the ecological functions 
and the integrity of the forest. 
6. A management plan -- appropriate to the scale and 
intensity of the operations -- shall be written, imple-
mented, and kept up to date. The long term objectives 
115 E.g., David M. Trubek, Yves Dezalay, Ruth Buchanan, and John R. 
Davis, Global Restructuring and The Law: Studies of the Internationaliza-
tion of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE 
W. RES. 407 (1994) (emerging systemic relationships, particularly the 
growth of a global trading order, may drive changes in both private and 
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of management, and the means of achieving them, 
shall be clearly stated. 
7. Monitoring shall be conducted -- appropriate to the 
scale and intensity of forest management -- to assess 
the condition of the forest, yields of forest products, 
chain of custody, management activities and their so-
cial and environmental impacts. 
8. Management activities in high conservation value 
forests shall maintain or enhance the attributes which 
define such forests. Decisions regarding high conser-
vation value forests shall always be considered in the 
context of a precautionary approach. 
9. Plantations shall be planned and managed in accor-
dance with Principles and Criteria 1 - 9, and Principle 
10 and its Criteria. While plantations can provide an 
array of social and economic benefits, and can con-
tribute to satisfying the world's needs for forest prod-
ucts, they should complement the management of, 
reduce pressures on, and promote the restoration and 
conservation of natural forests. 
Exemplifying the countless standards and indicators 
implementing the principles and criteria are those of the 
Canadian Maritime Region regarding biodiversity, which 
were promulgated as a regional application of Principle 6 
above: 
6.2 * Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threat-
ened, and endangered species and their habitats (e.g. 
nesting and feeding areas). Conservation zones and 
protection areas, appropriate to the scale and intensity 
of forest management and the uniqueness of the af-
fected resources, shall be established. Inappropriate 
hunting, fishing, trapping and collecting shall be con-
trolled. 
6.2.1 * Threatened and endangered species (listed by 
provincial and federal endangered species legislation) 
and their habitat must be protected or managed in ac-
cordance with approved recovery plans. Where re-
covery plans are not yet approved, disturbance of 
known occurrences of such species is to be avoided 
and a cautionary approach taken to protect their 
habitat. Forest owner/manager activities must ensure 
that species that are rare, vulnerable or under investi-
gation by COSEWIC, or their provincial equivalents 
as designated by recognized authorities (e.g. aca-
demic experts, provincial or national museums or 
COSEWIC) are not further threatened by timber or 
non-timber activities. 
Indicators: 
Areas are inventoried for such species before harvesting, 
stand improvement or road-building activities are car-
ried out (appropriate to the scale and intensity of the 
operation). 
Protection of such species is addressed in the manage-
ment plan. 
Known occurrences of such species and their habitat are 
not disturbed. 
Forest workers are aware of known occurrences of 
such species and are following the management plan 
with respect to protecting such species and their 
habitat. 
Management staff is aware of those species that may 
occur locally. 
6.2.2 * Old growth stands must not be harvested. 
Indicators: 
Inventories are carried out to identify old growth stands 
(appropriate to the scale and intensity of the opera-
tion). 
Old growth stands are identified on management plan 
maps. 
No evidence of harvesting old growth stands exists. 
Management and forest workers are aware of the charac-
teristics of old growth stands. 
6.2.3 Areas with unusually high native species or eco-
system diversity must be identified, and protected or 
managed in such a way as to ensure that the diversity 
is not lost. 
Indicators: 
Management has identified areas with unusually high 
native species or ecosystem diversity using the latest 
regional methodolgy, formulae, and/or techniques 
(e.g. those used by WWF, Greater Fundy Ecosystem 
Research Group or New Brunswick Nature Trust). 
Such areas are identified on management plan maps. 
Management plans detail measures to ensure the diversity 
of such sites is not lost. 
Forest workers are following the management plan meas-
ures to ensure the diversity of such sites is not lost. 
Appendix B. The ISO Environmental Management 
System Standard’s environmental policy provi-
sion. 
4.2 Environmental Policy 
Top management shall define the organization’s envi-
ronmental policy and ensure that it 
a) is appropriate to the nature, scale and environ-
mental impacts of its activities, products or services; 
b) includes a commitment to continual improvement 
and prevention of pollution; 
c) includes a commitment to comply with relevant 
environmental legislation and regulations, and with 
other requirements to which the organization sub-
scribes; 
d) provides the framework for setting and reviewing 
environmental objectives and targets; 
e) is documented, implemented and maintained and 
communicated to all employees; 
f) is available to the public.116 
116 ISO, International Standard 14001, Environmental management systems 
-- Specification with guidance for use. § 4.2. 
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